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Public Law
LABOR LAW
Charles A. Reynard*
For those in the ranks of organized labor the most significant
development in labor law during the past year was legislative
rather than judicial - the repeal of the Right to Work Act.1 In
the course of processing its labor cases, however, the Supreme
Court had occasion to note the repeal when the case of Piegts v.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters,2 criticised in these pages last year,8
returned to the scene under the name of MirabeauFood Store v.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters.4 The plaintiff in the former suit
had, in the interim, transferred his business to his sons and when
the union continued to picket the premises as a means of achieving its objective of a collective bargaining agreement, the new
owners sought an injunction on the same theory advanced in the
previous case - that the picketing constituted a violation of the
Right to Work Act. Taking note of the fact that the Legislature
had passed the repealer, the court declined to reconsider its previous ruling that peaceful picketing violated the provisions of the
act. Although the repeal had not yet become effective, the court
noted that it would become operative before any decree that it
might issue would become final.
Three other cases touching upon the employment relation
came before the court during the past term, two of which warrant only brief mention here. Connell v. Dulien Steel Productss
was a suit by an employee against his former employer for unpaid overtime wages allegedly due as a result of violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. 6 The sole issue before the court was
one of fact relating to the actual number of hours which the
plaintiff, a night watchman, actually worked. The trial court
had resolved a serious conflict in the testimony in favor of the
plaintiff and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 23:881 et aeq. (1950).
2. 228 La. 131, 81 So.2d 835 (1955).
3. 16 LOuISIANA LAW REvuw 301 et seq. (1956).
4. 89 So.2d 392 (La. 1956).
5. 228 La. 1093, 85 So.2d 3 (1956).
6. 29 U.S.C.A. 201 et seq.
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The second case, Elliott v. General Gas Corporation,
another employee suit; this one against an employer for damages
and attorney's fees under the provisions of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:631 and 632. These statutory provisions make it the
duty of an employer to pay all wages due to an employee who is
discharged or resigns "within twenty-four hours after such discharge or resignation . . . upon demand being made upon the
employer by the discharged or resigned laborer." Without reviewing the detailed facts of the case it may be said that it appears that the employer in this instance met the twenty-four
hour requirement established by the statute, but there was an
error in the check tendered the employee in payment for his services because of an inadvertent failure to include payment for
work performed on a holiday which was done without the employer's knowledge. The court applied the principle of strict construction established by prior jurisprudence on the point 8 which
has regarded the statute as penal in nature and concluded that
the refusal or failure to make the payment required by the statute must be knowing or intentional.

The most significant decision of the term in the area of labor
relations was Mississippi Valley Electric Co. v. General Truck
Drivers,9 which, for the third consecutive year, presented the
court with the troublesome problem of federalism in the regulation of labor-management affairs. As a consequence of the 1953
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Garnercase10
holding that the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board to hear and consider charges of unfair labor practices
arising under the federal act is exclusive and ousts state courts
of the power to act, the state tribunals have been faced with the
troublesome task of determining the extent of their authority in
borderline cases. At the 1953-1954 term the Louisiana court correctly applied the principle that state courts may continue to
exercise jurisdiction in cases affecting interstate commerce if
the conduct imputed to the union consists of violence, calling for
the exercise of the state's police power." At the 1954-1955 term
7. 229 La. 128, 85 So.2d 55 (1956).
8. Deardorf, v. Hunter, 160 La. 213, 106 So. 831 (1926) ; Hazel v. Robinson &
Young, 187 La. 51, 174 So. 105 (1937) ; Bannon v. Techeland Oil Corp., 205 La.
689, 17 So.2d 921 (1944) and Strickland v. American Pitch Pine Export Co., 224
La. 949, 71 So.2d 338 (1954).
9. 229 La. 37, 85 So.2d 22 (1956).
10. Garner v. Teamster Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
11. Douglas Public Service Corp. v. Gaspard, 225 La. 145, 74 So.2d 182 (1954).
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the court, improperly as this writer saw it, 1 2 held that the principle of the Garner case did not strip state courts of the power
to enjoin peaceful picketing by a union which had failed to file
the non-Communist affidavits required by the federal act. Since
picketing by such a union did not constitute an unfair labor practice, the Louisiana court reasoned that the Garner case was no
bar to the exercise of state court jurisdiction, and refused to be
persuaded that picketing (even by a non-complying union) was
one of the rights protected by the federal act.18 Following a
grant of certiorari in that case, the United States Supreme Court
4
reversed.1
During the term just closed, the court had occasion to review
the matter once again in the Mississippi Valley case, and this
time declined to intervene because it recognized the jurisdiction
of the National Labor Relations Board to be exclusive on the
basis of the facts presented in the record. The facts showed that
the defendant union was peacefully picketing the premises of the
plaintiff employer following unsuccessful attempts to renew a
collective bargaining agreement between the parties. In the
course of the parties' difficulties, the union had petitioned the
National Board for certification as the collective bargaining
agent for the unit involved in the dispute, but the Board, after
considering the petition, had dismissed the case because it found
that the unit, consisting of a single employee, was not appropriate for its certification for collective bargaining. In the interim, the employer had filed its suit for an injunction to
restrain the union's picketing, and the trial court granted preliminary relief for the purpose of enabling the employer to obtain
a ruling from the National Board concerning its jurisdiction in
the premises. The employer then filed a charge with the Board
alleging that the union's picketing constituted a violation of Section 8 (b) (4) of the federal act. This charge was ultimately dismissed and further consideration by the Board was refused,
whereupon the employer renewed his request for injunctive relief at the hands of the state court. Construing the Board's dismissal as a ruling that the union was not guilty of any unfair
labor practice, the trial court dismissed the employer's suit and
the Supreme Court was asked to review the proceedings. In afLAW REViEW 296 et seq. (1956).
13. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co. v. United Mine Workers, 227 La. 1109, 81 So.2d
413 (1955).
14. United Mine Workers of America v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S.
62 (1956).
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firming the action of the trial court, the Supreme Court said,
inter alia,
"It is not our intention to hold that the peaceful picketing
of which the employer complains in the instant case falls
within the prohibition or protection of the Taft-Hartley Act,
for we recognize that primary jurisdiction to determine these
questions rests with the National Labor Relations Board, and
not with the state court."' 6
Adopting the rationale of the United States Supreme Court in the
case of Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,' 7 the Louisiana court
reasoned that the Board's dismissal of a charge of union violation of Section 8(b) (4) was not dispositive of the inquiry
whether other sections of the act may not have been violated by
the union, and, in any case, it was wholly inconclusive of the
issue whether the union's activity constituted a right protected
by the act. All of these inquiries are properly referred to the
Board and outside the state court's jurisdiction. The decision
seems entirely correct and the court appears to have a complete
appreciation of this most difficult problem of federalism - or
jurisdictional tidelands of labor relations, as it has aptly been
called.
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Dale E. Bennett*
ENACTMENT
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COMPLIANCE WITH READING REQUIREMENTS

In Doll v. New Orleans' the Supreme Court invalidated a
1954 act of the Louisiana Legislature 2 on the ground that it had
not been read on three different days as required by Article III,
Section 24, of the Louisiana Constitution. The Constitution does
not require that compliance with this provision be shown by a
Journalentry. If the Journalsare silent as to compliance or noncompliance with this type of constitutional requirement, the
courts conclusively presume that the constitutional mandate has
15. 229 La. 37, 85 So.2d 22 (1956).
16. 229 La. 37, 50, 85 So.2d 22, 27 (1956).
17. 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 229 La. 277, 85 So.2d 514 (1956), 17 LoUISIANA LAW REvIEw ... (1956).
2. La. Acts 1954, no. 536, p. 1001, incorporated as LA. R.S. 47:2190 (1950).
3. LA. CONST. Art. III, §24: "Every bill shall be read on three different days
ineach house ...."

